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ABSTRACT 
SOME NECESSARY REMARKS ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
APOSTOLOS CH. FRANGOS 
GREEK ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTISTS 
FOR THE SCIENTIFIC TRUTH 
43, ELLANIKOU STREET 
ATHENS 11635, GREECE 
Dea 1 i n9 wi th sci ence, eva 1 ut ion; sts create una 11 owab 1 e confus i on between the val; d i ty of 
scientific data and the arbitrary interpretation they give to them as the only scientific one. 
So it is necessary to clarify some basic boundaries of scientific knowledge. This paper 
attempts to trace some aspects of this issue. 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
The assertion by evolutionists that their explanation of the scientific findings and data are 
exclusively in favor of the evolutionary idea as being the only scientific conclusion, is an 
unallowable postulate. They create confusion between the validity of the objective scientific 
data in the domain of empirical sciences and their arbitrary interpretation, based upon 
metaphysical assumptions and indoctrination practiced by them. 
This situation is posing once more a serious problem for the conditions required for 
scientific knowledge. Of course it is not possible, even briefly, in this paper to deal with 
th is problem, one of the most fundamental in epi sterno logy and ph i 10sophy of sc i ence. What is 
attempted is to trace some main aspects and to point out certain characteristics and present 
the existing difficulties for objective scientific knowledge. In this way it will be easy to 
evaluate with distinctness the contention of evolutionists about the validity and consistency 
of their explanations of the data, and to find out if they are indicative of evolution as a 
scientific fact or not. 
In following such a course it is necessary to look into the fundamental background of 
empirical sciences; i.e., into the basic presuppositions on which they are erected. 
NECESSARY PRESUPPOSITIONS IN SCIENCE 
For the existence of science itself, as a human endeavor, it is absolutely necessary to adopt 
some basic fundamental assumptions. Without them empirical science is not possible. 
Since sc i ence. beyond the var; ous phil osophi ca 1 views and d i sputat ions, by its generally 
accepted definition and purposes is essentially a human systematic empirical attempt to 
investigate and learn as much as possible about the natural world , (1) we are obliged to 
accept some admiSSions which are fundamental necessities inherent to empirical science . Any 
questioning or refusal of these fundamental assumptions , which are empirical ascertainments 
independent of any philosophical attempt to explain or question them, entails the denial of 
any scientific activity and science itself. In such a case science is replaced by 
philosophical wanderings or metaphysical beliefs . We should point out that these basic 
assumptions have also the aspect of limitations in scientific knowledge along with some others 
to be mentioned afterward. 
It is a fact that science, as any other human activity. is built upon several assumptions. We 
assume certain things which seem to require no proof and are recognized through common sense. 
These principles are taken for granted because it is not possible to become subject to a 
scientific test (verification or falsification). 
The fundamental principles and assumptions in Question are: 
a) The self-consciousness of our real existence. 
b) The external natural world is real and understandable at least in some extent. 
c) Our natural senses give us a reasonable and reliable perception of the external world. 
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d) The natural world is orderly and reproducible and therefore subject to and worthy of 
systematic investigation. 
e} The laws of logic are valid. 
f) Observable effects underlie causes and hence the principle of causality governs the natural 
world (2). 
As for the last premise, it is worthwhile to make some remarks. 
roots in our act i n9 upon the warl d to change it. We all "know" 
cause of the changes that ensue. When we act we assume we can 
assumption presupposes that there are regularities in nature (3). 
The idea of "cause" has its 
that when we act we are the 
make thi ngs happen and thi s 
Neverthe 1 ess, independent of the ph il asaph i ca 1 not i on and debate about the law of Un; versa 1 
Causal ity as a regularity in nature, or as a metaphysical way of stating a piece of 
methodological advice (4). it is an empirical conclusion with a logical consistency that the 
causa 1 necess i ty is one of the rna i n assumpt ions for the exi stence of empi ri ca 1 sc i ence (5). 
Things happen because other things happen and they in turn happen because of preceding events, 
and so on in a chain of cause and effect that ultimately encompasses the entire universe (6). 
Thi s pri nci p 1 e is not yet a statement of the ex i stence of causal i ty in nature. Indeed, it is 
even more fundamental than is causality, for it is at the foundation of the possibility of our 
understanding nature in a rational way (6a). 
LIMITATIONS IN RESEARCH AND UNDERSTANDING THE NATURAL WORLD 
The possibility of knowledge and understanding of the natural world are not unlimited. 
Wideness and possible extension of scientific knowledge in empirical science is one of the 
most challenging problems in epistemology (the theory of scientific knowledge) and in 
philosophy of science as well . 
This paper attempts to mention briefly some of the most significant restrictions existing in 
science. It must be emphasized that science, as a human empirical attempt, is not adequate to 
explain everything . It provides a continuously increasing number, but certainly not all the 
answers. Science has several fundamental 1 imitations in trying to search and understand the 
natural world. 
Unfortunately, there are many problems for which science has no answers at present and others 
for which it may never provide answers (7). 
The previously mentioned principles and basic assumptions, necessary for the existence of 
science itself, are also boundaries and restrictions in the sCientific inquiry. Further, 
there are some other limitations, existing due to several reasons, as follows: 
A. SCIENCE IS CONFINED BY THE METHODS NECESSARY IN USE TO INVESTIGATE THE NATURAL WORLD 
These are: I) Induction, in which, using particularity, we formulate generalizations, and 2) 
Deduction, in which, using inferential logic, we determine the necessary consequences of a 
generalization. 
The problem with Induction is well known (a) , that inductive generalizations cannot be proved 
to be immune from revision that more information (more experience) may lead to modify our 
sc i ent i fi c general i zat ions. ( Induct i on cannot be shown to be immune from error) . Induct i ve 
inferences cannot be shown to lead to conclusions which are certainly true, even though all 
the premises, that is, the descriptions of the particular events, are true. But we must make 
the best of what we have for inductive inference in the process by which we acquire knowledge 
from sense. Inductions support all our knowledge of the empirical world. 
On the other hand. the classical form of inference is deduction inference. Here the process 
of inference is; n accordance with accepted rul es of log i c and if the inference is valid. 
that is, if the rules are correctly followed. the conclusion cannot be false (if the premises 
are true) since the conclusion can contain no more information that what is found in the 
premises. However, the fact remains that deductive inference can never tel" us more than is 
contained in the axioms; and since the axioms, or assumptions , are devised or accepted by us, 
deductive inference can only reveal the nature of our own constructed systems (9). 
Here we must mention what Professor Sir Peter Medawar called the "law of Conservation of 
Information," which tells us that there is an intrinsic, built-in limitation upon the growth 
of scientific understanding because no progress of logical reasoning can enlarge the 
information content of the axioms and premises or observational statements from which it 
proceeds. That is, from observational statements or descriptive laws having only empirical 
furniture , there is no process of reasoning by which we may derive theorems having to do with 
first and last causes (10). Thus , as Garvin McCain and Erwin Segal say: The game of science 
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never ends; all conclusions are tentative. No matter how much information scientists have, 
they can never be certain of any of their conclusions. Information about the real world 
ultimately has to be known by induction, and nothing that is known by induction is known for 
certain. There is no way one can gain certain knowledge about the real world (11). 
B. SCIENCE IS LIMITED TO WHAT CAN BE OBSERVED WITH FIVE SENSES 
The only way by which we can investigate the natural world is through observation and 
experimentat i on, both i nvo 1 vi ng the human senses (i n most cases aided by ins truments) . If 
something can be seen, heard, touched, smelled , or tested then science can deal with it. The 
well-known evolutionist Professor George Gaylord Simpson said: "It is inherent in any 
definition of science that statements that cannot be checked by observation are not really 
saying anything or at least they are not science (12). 
C. SCIENCE AND ITS METHOD ARE LIMITED TO THE PRESENT 
This is self-evident, an axiomatic statement that hardly needs annotation. Science is limited 
to the present because it is the only place and time in which the five senses operate. 
Science seeks to investigate observable natural phenomena and events and to treat by means of 
experiments. But observational and experimental requirements can be met only in the present 
time. The past and, espeCially, the beginning of things lies beyond the grasp of capabilities 
of science and so only speculations and conjectures are possible about past natural events and 
their origin, as well as about the origin of the natural world as a whole (l0). So, it is 
obvious to any unprejudiced mind that true science must 1 imit its scope to things properly 
observed and recorded. In this sense, for instance, geology, when trying to tell us about 
pre-human history of natural events, cannot deal with currently observable and reproducible 
events. It is manifestly impossible ever really to prove or disprove by the scientific method 
any hypothesis or theory related to such natural events of the past. 
D. SCIENCE IS POWERLESS TO EXPLAIN ORIGINS 
This is a certain and important 1 imitation derived by the nature of science itself as an 
empi ri ca 1 attempt. I t can defi ne methods, qua 1 it i es, and 1 imits, but it can't determi ne 
origins. Science is concerned with and can deal with a given physical system already in 
operation. Everything in the empirical world which is not reproducible, at least in its main 
essential and typical characteristics and components, is excluded from scientific research. 
The only way to approach these unique events of the natural world, not reproducible at the 
time of investigation due to their inherent inaccessible character, is the formulation of 
various equally valid but tentative and speculative explanatory hypotheses or theories. But 
such theories, in turn, cannot give any scientific knowledge since they may be reasonable yet 
contradictory to each other due to their compulsory, dogmatic, metaphysical, or religious 
bases and a priori assumptions, which cannot be subject to any scientific test in order to 
prove or disprove their postulates (2). 
E. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IS LIMITED TO TELLING US 'HOW' A PROCESS WORKS, NOT ' WHY' 
Science can give us the "know-how" but cannot give us the "know-why" (13). Scientific 
research seeks to answer quest ions of "what" and "how," and sometimes "where" and "when." but 
it can never deal with "why" questions. The scientific method is incapable of deal lng with 
the realm of purpose. It can deal with "why" when one uses the term "why" with reference to 
purpose. Science deals with mechanisms , not purpose. "Why" in regard to purpose ;s not a 
question that science is equipped to answer (14). 
Usually scientists not only offer us descriptions and classifications of things and materials 
and their actions and interactions, but also give us explanations. They can often explain why 
there are the things that there are. They can explain why things and materials behave the way 
they do. Such explanations are usually given by the formulation of a theory. Science is not 
natural historYi it is not the accumulation of facts. It is the building of a picture of the 
world. It is an intellectual enterprise aimed at understanding the world . What makes it 
different from other such enterprises, say that of the makers of works of art, is that it is 
done under the discipl ine of the experimental method. A theory whose consequences cannot be 
born out by experiment and observation must be modified or some defect in the experiment 
demonstrated (15). 
F. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IS LIMITED IN THAT IT CANNOT DEAL WITH THE UNIQUE 
Scientific research deals with those things that are: a) timeless, b) universal , c) 
dependable, and d} repeatable at will. Those things which do not fit into these categories 
are outside the realm of science. One-time events on earth are outside of science . At the 
core of scientific method or methods is experimental repeatability or reproducibility. 
Singularities are excluded from the capabilities of scientific investigation. 
G. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IS LIMITED BY MEASUREMENTS 
Another limitation of science concerns the accuracy of measurements. We can't measure 
anything completely accurately and we never will be able to, if our current conceptions of 
phys i cs are accurate. He; sen berg' s Uncerta i nty Pri nc i p 1 e 1 eads to the cone 1 us i on that there 
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are limits to the accuracy of our measurement. When sub-atomic particles are involved, there 
is no way to measure simultaneously both their velocity and their location. Thus one can't 
accurately predict a particle's future location and velocity. Furthermore , the apparatus used 
to measure sub -atomic particles affects their location and velocity. 
H. SCIENCE AND REALITY 
The las t 1 imit of sc i ence falls under the general head i ng of "metaphys i cs. " There are 
questions about reality : What are electr ons? 
Of what is a table really made? Does magnetism exist? These questions can be most 
exasperating and they cannot be answered . Scientists start with a set of undefined terms. 
They may think that they are real, and they may give them some properties, but they cannot 
tell you what they really are (16). 
Finally, we must emphasize that the last and ultimate formation and substance of the things 
that constitute the natural world will escape forever any attempt at empirical scientific 
knowledge , mainly due to the fact that such a quest is not scientific but exclusively a 
philosophical one. These are the main limitations existing in science and scientific 
questions about research. 
Thus, in accordance with these 1 imitations, the theory of evolution evidently does not meet 
the necessary requirements in order to be a pure scientific theory capable of furnishing 
sc i ent ifi c knowl edge. I n add it i on, the important issue of the exp 1 an at i on of data by the 
evolutionary theory reveals its real nature as a non - scientific theory. 
EXPLANATIONS OF NATURAL PHENOMENA AND EVENTS 
As has been mentioned, scientists not only offer descriptions and classifications of things 
and their interactions, but they also try to give explanations. They try to explain why 
things behave the way they do . Such explanations are usually given by the formulation of 
theories aimed at understanding the natural world. Any hypothesis or theory is a useful tool 
and opens new roads to knowledge. But because it ;s a tool, any theory also has limitations 
(17) . 
Scientific hypotheses and theories differ from dogma (philosophical or metaphysical 
assumptions) on the one hand and speculation on the other in that hypotheses and theories are 
tentative and falsifiable by the empirical, scientific ways of testing; i.e., observation and 
experimentation. So, if hypotheses and theories are proposed in such a way that they cannot 
possibly or practically be discredited, then they lie outside the domain of science. A theory 
unchallenged and conSistently supported by facts is called a law of nature. 
But the process of moving from general ;zations (hypotheses and theories) to a law of nature 
does not necessarily mean the generalization has become fact; the likelihood of its being 
correct merely increases, or as it is commonly stated, it has a higher statistical probability 
of being right (17). Neither hypothesis nor theory-even a law-is in the same state as 
abso 1 ute truth . All these rest upon a perenn i a 11y shaky foundat i on and all are vu 1 nerab 1 e to 
uncomfortab 1 e facts. Sc i ent ifi c studi es do not produce i nformat i on wh i ch is absolutely 
certain. It might be argued that while we can be said to know those particular facts about 
the world which make up the evidence for laws, we can only properly be said to have a belief 
in a law. 
Some people have thought that , strictly speaking. the content of scientific laws should be 
considered to be confined to the statistics of sets of numbers derived from the readings of 
instruments. Others have thought that the 1 aws of nature are about the behavior of real 
things and materials that make up the world as we know it. Yet others have thought that they 
describe nothing but the ordered sequences of sensations that we experience (15). Anyway, 
laws of nature are only humanly constructed descriptions of humanly comprehensible phenomena. 
With regard to the uniformity of nature, modern science often takes yet another leap of faith 
and extends the induction generalization process not just to all of cosmic time, but to all of 
space as well. This is the pure assumption of the universal uniformity of matter 
(uniformitarianism). an unstated assumption made by many individuals that deal with long term 
developing natural systems, such as astronomy, cosmology, micro- and macro-evolution, 
anthropology, and many others (18). 
THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATIONS 
To explain a phenomenon, we must be able to describe the causal mechanism which ;s responsible 
for it. But in each area scientists find themselves incapable of proceeding more deeply into 
a matter. And in each area scientists explain this temporary ending of scientific penetration 
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by a metaphysical theory in which what is basic for one time and one limited scientific 
culture is elevated to the status of the ultimate. So, both scientific and metaphysical 
theories enter into descriptions and into our understanding of them in several ways (19). 
Severa 1 compet i ng exp 1 ana t ions for the same phenomenon may be equa 11 y at tract i ve and often 
none of them can be proved false. 
In the case of the theory of evolution the raw data used by evolutionists can be interpreted 
just as satisfactorily within a creationist framework (20). The theory of evolution, like 
other theories, depends on the interpretation of data. The rel iabi1 ity of the data and how 
the data are interpreted depend upon the theory that is held by the investigator; i.e. , the 
presuppositions and dogmatic assumptions on which the theory is based and founded. Reported 
data and human knowledge are not the same thing. The facts do not speak for themselves. They 
must be interpreted and they say what their interpreter makes them say. So, the data are 
always interpreted or explained from a given world view or presuppositiona1 stance which 
underlies any hypothesis, theory, or model . Thus it should be no wonder that we can interpret 
the same data in different ways with an internal logical consistency and come to quite 
different conclusions (21). 
The scientific issues are indisputably important, but they derive their importance from much 
deeper issues that touch upon humanity ' s highest aspirations and fundamental existential 
questions, like the quest for God. Although many people abstain from facing these questions, 
they demand answers and finally lend an understandable intensity to the scientific 
controversies. They also erect a very strong and subtle, but decisive , influence on the 
conduct of scientific studies and interpretation of scientific data (21). 
Evolutionists are interpreting scientific data and findings in conformity with the 
natural istic -material istic presuppositiona1 worldview, which is their metaphysical-rel igious, 
dogmatic preference and not, as they assert, a scientific theory, since it can ' t be subject to 
any test in a scientific, empirical way. 
The same must be said for creationists who explain and interpret the same scientific data and 
findings in a different way, based upon the revealed biblical view of the natural world in 
terms of the existence and intervention of the God-Creator . 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it has been demonstrated that: a) Scientific inquiry 1 ies within certain 
1 imitations , both in attempting to investigate the natural events as well as to explain and 
understand them in a scientificall y empirical way; b) These 1 imitations lead usually to theories 
and models devised to understand and explain natural events, based on metaphysical assertions 
which are not possible to be verified or falsified in an empirical, scientific way; i.e., 
observation or experimentation. From this point of view, almost all the basic theoretical 
constructions of modern physics, based on assumptions or postulates which are not subject to 
any empirical tests. are philosophical and metaphysical assertions and not scientific ones. 
c) Consequently, the theory of evolution founded on the metaphysical natura1istic-
materialistic assumption and world view, in trying to explain origins and understand and 
interpret the pertinent scientific data, is, evidently, not a scientific theory or model but a 
metaphysical-religious a priori postulate and doctrine unverifiable and unfalsifiable. 
For the sake of val idity and independence of science from interferences and scopes al ien to 
its aims , I think it is neces sary nowadays to reveal the fact that evolutionary theory 
monopolizes science in its favor unal10wably and to demonstrate that evolution is a 
metaphysical-religious proposal which requires faith and faith only for its acceptance. being 
unable to furnish sound scientific knowledge. 
SUKKARY 
Science as a human, systematic. empirical attempt to study the natural world is not adequate 
to explain everything. Science has fundamental limitations because: 
a) It is built upon some basic principles absolutely necessary for its existence. 
b) It is confined by the methods of investigation (induction, deduction). 
c) It is limited to observables with senses (observation-experimentation) . 
d) It is limited to the present in which the five senses operate. 
e) It is limited to "how" a process works , not to "why." It is incapable of dealing with 
purpose. 
f) It is limited by unique events. Singularities are outside the capabilities of scientific 
investigation. 
In the face of such limitations, the hypotheses and theories of scientific operation function 
as useful tools, but also have certain limitations: 
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1) They should be tentative and falsifiable. 
2) They should be able to make testable predictions. 
3) Any explanation offered by them should be testable. 
Theori es offeri n9 exp lanat ions 1 rrefutab 1 e by experi enee cease to be sc i ent ifi c. They become 
either analytic definitions or metaphysical dogmatic assumptions. The theory of evolution 
depends on an arbitrary interpretation of observations and data which is not empirically 
testable; therefore, evolution is not a scientific theory but exclusively a metaphysical or 
philosophical dogmatic postulate, being unable to offer scientific knowledge. 
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